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ABSTRACT 
The development of honeypots as decoys designed to detect, investigate, and 
counterattack unauthorized use of information systems has produced an “arms 
race” between honeypots (computers designed solely to receive cyber attacks) 
and anti-honeypot technology. To test the current state of this race, we 
performed experiments in which we ran a small group of honeypots, using the 
low-interaction honeypot software Honeyd, on a network outside campus firewall 
protection.  
For 15 weeks, we ran different configurations of ports and service scripts, 
and simulated operating systems to check which configurations were most useful 
as a research honeypot and which were most useful as decoys to protect other 
network users. We analyzed results in order to improve the results for both 
purposes in subsequent weeks. We did find promising configurations for both 
purposes; however, configurations good for one purpose were not necessarily 
good for the other. We also tested the limits of Honeyd software and identified 
aspects of it that need to be improved. We also identified the most common 
attacks, most common ports used by attackers, and degree of success of decoy 
service scripts. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, the development of honeypots—decoys set to detect, 
deflect, or counterattack an unauthorized use of information systems—has been 
successful enough that attackers have been forced to develop techniques to 
detect and neutralize honeypots when they are trying to attack networks. Some 
of these techniques have been successful, leading some security professionals 
to think that the use of honeypots is now outdated. However, there are also 
countermeasures against this anti-honeypot technology.  
A powerful and flexible tool that is freely available to deploy multiple 
honeypots is Honeyd (Honey daemon), developed by Security expert Niels 
Provos [1]. It allows a user to set up and run multiple virtual hosts on a network 
with services and specific operating systems running. According to its creator, 
Honeyd could be used for two purposes: as a honeypot, attracting attackers that 
later could be traced, analyzed, and investigated, and as decoy or distraction, 
hiding real systems in the middle of virtual systems. The purpose of this study is 
to analyze how useful Honeyd is for both purposes, and to assess which actions 
or countermeasures could be useful to improve its performance against possible 
attackers. 
We set up an experiment using a small network on the NPS campus that 
is not protected by the campus firewall. We ran a group of honeypots created 
with the aforementioned software and tested them in different runs with different 
configurations. During the experiment, we analyzed results week by week to 
identify the best configuration of Honeyd for both research and decoy purposes. 
We tried to test as many features of Honeyd as possible, such as simulation of 
open, closed, or filtered ports, and emulation of operating systems at TCP/IP 
stack level, service scripts associated to certain well-known ports. In order to 
create a credible set of virtual machines, we also tested small details like 
changes in the MAC addresses, set drop rates, set uptime, and the use of proxy 
and tarpit capabilities to create a credible set of virtual machines. 
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In Chapter II, we provide background for this thesis. In Chapter III we 
describe the applications and software used to set and analyze the results of the 
experiment. In Chapter IV, we describe the methodology applied to execute and 
analyze the experiments in this study. In Chapter V, we analyze results obtained 
in the experiments: alerts, operating systems emulation, ports attacked, service 
scripts, Honeyd as a honeypot, and Honeyd as decoy. In Chapter VI, we state 
conclusions obtained in this study and possible future work. Three appendices 
provide details of the configurations used each week, the text of the code and 
commands used, and an analysis of the Nmap operating system detection in 
relation to Honeyd. 
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II.  PREVIOUS WORK AND BACKGROUND 
A. HONEYPOTS 
The concept of warfare in cyberspace is very similar to that of 
conventional warfare. 
Understanding our capabilities and vulnerabilities, and those of our 
adversaries, allows us to create better defensive and offensive plans. Before 
1999, there was very little information about cyber-attacker threats and 
techniques. Although there were some previous attempts to obtain information 
about attackers, the creation of the Honeynet Project [2] was the answer to that 
lack of knowledge. This project is an international nonprofit research organization 
that collects and analyzes cyber-attacks using a creative-attack data collection 
tool, the honeypot.  
A honeypot is a trap set to detect, analyze, or in some manner counteract 
attempts of unauthorized use of information systems. Generally, it consists of a 
computer, data, or network site which seems to contain information or resources 
of value to attackers, but is actually isolated, protected, and monitored. 
The value of a honeypot lies in the fact that its use is unauthorized or illicit 
[2] because it is not designated as a production component of an information 
infrastructure. Nobody outside the creator of the honeypot should be using or 
interacting with honeypots; any interaction with a honeypot is not authorized and 
is therefore suspicious. Because of this, there are no false positives. 
1.  Variations of Honeypots According to Their Interaction Level 
There are two main categories of honeypots: Low-interaction and high-
interaction [3]. 
Low-interaction honeypots are passive, and cyber attackers are limited to 




to deploy and pose minimal risk to the administrators. Examples of low-
interaction honeypots are Honeyd, LaBrea Tarpit, BackOfficer Friendly, Specter, 
and KFSensor. 
High-interaction honeypots provide working operating systems and 
applications for attackers to interact with. They are more complex and serve as 
better intelligence-collection tools. However, they pose a higher level of risk to 
the administrator due to their potential of being compromised by cyber attackers, 
as for instance, with the use of compromised honeypots to propagate other 
attacks. Examples are the Symantec Decoy Server (formerly ManTrap) and 
honeynets as an architecture (as opposed to a product or software). 
Table 1 summarizes honeypots according to their interaction level. 
 
Low-interaction High-interaction 
Honeypot emulates operating 
systems, services and network stack. 
Full operating systems, applications, 
and services are provided. 
Easy to install and deploy. Usually 
requires simply installing and 
configuring software on a computer.  
Can be complex to install and deploy 
(although commercial versions tend to 
be simpler).  
Captures limited amounts of 
information, mainly transactional data 
and some limited interaction. 
Can capture far more information, 
including new tools, communications, 
and attacker keystrokes.  
Minimal risk of compromise, as the 
emulated services control what 
attackers can and cannot do.  
Increased risk of compromise, as 
attackers are provided with real 
operating systems with which to 
interact.  




2. Types of Honeypots According to Their Purpose 
Honeypots can be deployed as production or research systems [3]. When 
deployed as production systems, typically in an enterprise or military network, 
honeypots can serve to prevent, detect, bait, and respond to attacks. When 
deployed as research systems, typically in a university or institute, they serve to 
collect information on threats for analysis, study, and security enhancement. 
3. Types of Honeypots According to Their Implementation 
Another distinction exists between physical and virtual honeypots [3]. 
Physical means that the honeypot is running on a real machine, suggesting that it 
could be high-interaction and able to be compromised completely. Physical 
honeypots are expensive to maintain and install, making them impractical to 
deploy for large address spaces. 
Virtual honeypots use one real machine to run one or more virtual 
machines that act as honeypots. This allows for easier maintenance and lower 
physical requirements. Usually VMware and User-mode Linux (UML) are used to 
set up these honeypots. 
While reducing hardware requirements for the administrators, virtual 
honeypots give cyber attackers the perspective of independent systems in 
networks. This reduces the cost of management of the honeypots for production 
and research, compared to physical honeypots. There are, however, 
disadvantages. The use of the virtual machines is limited by the hardware 
virtualization software and the host operating system. The secure management 
of the host operating system and virtualization software has to be thoroughly 
planned and executed in order to prevent cyber attackers from seizing control of 
the host system, and eventually the entire honeynet. It is also easier to fingerprint 
a virtual honeynet, as opposed to honeynets deployed with real hardware, by the 




emulated by the virtualization software. Cyber attackers may potentially identify 
these signatures and avoid these machines, thereby defeating the purpose of 
deploying the honeynet. 
4. Types of Honeypots According to Their Side 
The last distinction is between server-side and client-side honeypots [3]. 
Traditional, server-side honeypots are servers which wait passively to be 
attacked, possibly offering bait. Client honeypots, by contrast, are active devices 
in search of malicious servers or other dangerous Internet locations that attack 
clients. The client honeypot appears to be a normal client as it interacts with a 
suspicious server and then examines whether an attack has occurred. The main 
target of client honeypots is Web browsers, but any client that interacts with 
servers can be part of a client honeypot, including SSH, FTP, and SMTP. 
Examples of client honeypots are HoneyC, HoneyMonkey, HoneyWare, 
and HoneyClient. 
5. Honeynets 
The value of honeypots can be increased by building them into a network; 
two or more honeypots on a network form a honeynet [2]. Integrating honeypots 
into networks can provide cyber attackers a realistic network of systems to 
interact with, and permits defenders a better analysis of distributed attacks.  
6. Monitoring Tools in a Honeypot 
Honeypots typically contain a set of standard tools, including a component 
to monitor, log, collect, and report the intruder’s activity inside the honeypot. The 
goal is to capture enough data to accurately recreate the events of the honeypot. 
Data collection can be done in many ways, the most important of which are: 
- Honeypot log files 
- Packet sniffing (network sniffing or intrusion detection systems) 
- Keystroke logging (or keylogging) 
- Snapshot software 
- Firewall logs 
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One example of a data capture tool used in honeypots is Sebek. It is an 
open-source tool whose purpose is to capture from a honeypot as much 
information as possible of the attacker’s activities on the host by intercepting 
specific system calls, or syscalls, at the kernel level. Sebek takes sophisticated 
measures to conceal itself, because honeypot monitoring software needs to 
function as stealthily as possible, so the intruder cannot detect it. Otherwise, the 
game is over and the honeypot defeated. 
As part of the defense-in-depth approach to information security (multiple 
layers of security controls), and a critical part of honeypot architecture, intrusion 
detection systems are deployed to detect potential incoming threats based on 
signature sets or anomalies. Although they are passive, they can overwhelm 
administrators with alerts instead of responses or actions against detected 
attacks. To address this problem, intrusion prevention systems can be used with 
higher thresholds for alerts; they extend the detection capability of IDS to include 
automated controls in response to cyber-attacks. For instance, they can ignore, 
block, or modify packets, preventing the success of the exploit. This active 
capability, however, comes at a cost to the performance of protected networks or 
systems. Snort is probably the most popular and well-known intrusion-detection 
system. It is useful in disabling attacks on a honeypot and for later analysis of the 
data, with the goal of detecting and understanding cyber-attacks against 
honeypots. 
B.  ANTI-HONEYPOT TECHNOLOGY 
When security professionals started to include honeypots and honeynets 
in their arsenal for information defense, cyber attackers reacted by creating tools 
to detect or disable honeypots. The use of this anti-honeypot technology means 
that honeypots were affecting the activities of attackers [4].  
If an attacker detects a honeypot, most of the time that attacker will avoid 
it and go to another place. But there is the risk that an attacker could compromise 
the honeypot and use it to attack other computers on the local network or 
Internet. The attacker could also try to disable it, delete the data, format the hard 
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drive, or post its address on hacker websites to prevent other attackers from 
begin ensnared by it. In any case, it results in the honeypot’s defeat. 
Most attackers will not bother to compromise a honeypot; however, if the 
honeypot is a high-priority attack target like a military command-and-control 
system, and the attacker is a foreign country, manipulation of that honeypot 
might be desirable. To accomplish such manipulation, several techniques and 
tools useful to cyber attackers for footprinting or analyzing systems can be 
reused or adapted. Some of these tools can detect suspicious environments like 
virtual machines, keyloggers, and debuggers. Additionally, most software used to 
build and run honeypots has distinguishable characteristics that give attackers 
clues, such as recognizable directory and file names. User-mode Linux and 
VMware might be detected in this way.  
Another approach to identifying honeypots is to experiment with detecting 
data collection tools like Sebek. For example, it is possible to detect Sebek by 
measuring execution time of the read() system call; excessive delays in the 
execution of some processes or a higher load than normal in a CPU are also 
good hints. Specific requests and responses to corrupted packets could give a 
clear warning to the attacker of the presence of Honeyd or—if there are more 
active responses—LaBrea Tarpit. 
There is also commercial honeypot-detection software available, such as 
Send-Safe Honeypot Hunter. This tool opens a local fake e-mail server on port 
25 (SMTP) and asks each proxy to connect back to itself. If the proxy claims that 
a session is OK when there is no related incoming session, a possible honeypot 
is detected. 






Honeypot/Honeynet Typical Characteristics 
Methods for Detecting the 
Honeypot 
BackOfficer Friendly  
Restricted emulation of 
services and responses  
Send different requests and verify 
the consistency of responses for 
different services.  
LaBrea Tarpit  
TCP window size 0; 
bogus MAC address 
Check persistent TCP window size 




same clock for every host  
Send a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate traffic, with common 
signatures recognized by targeted 




suspicious packets could 
be dropped or modified.  
Send different packets and verify 
the existence and integrity of 
response packets.  
Virtual Honeynet 
(VMware) 
Virtualization and system 
files  
Detect virtual hardware by name 
and VMware MAC addresses. 
Probe for existence of VMware.  
Active tcpdump 
session or Sebek  
Logging processes  
Scan for active logging process or 
increased round-trip time (for 
instance, due to read() in Sebek-
based honeypots).  
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III.  DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLICATIONS 
We used several applications to implement the honeypots and to analyze 
the results: VMware, Honeyd, Snort, Microsoft Log Parser, Wireshark, Security 
Onion and Fedora 14. 
We will describe the applications used in the implementation, with a quick 
analysis of the methods to detect them, some countermeasures, and finally the 
software used to analyze the results. 
A. HONEYD 
Honeyd is an open-source program released under GNU General Public 
License that allows a user to set up and run multiple virtual hosts on a network. 
These virtual hosts can be configured to mimic several different types of servers, 
allowing the user to simulate many different computer-network configurations. 
The hosts can be configured to run arbitrary services, and their personality can 
be adapted so that they appear to be running certain operating systems. Honeyd 
enables a single host to claim multiple IP addresses. In this way, Honeyd deters 
adversaries by hiding real systems in the middle of virtual systems. 
This daemon software offers several interesting features: It is possible to 
Ping the virtual machines, or to run a traceroute to find their forwarding packets. 
Any type of service on the virtual machine can be simulated according to a 
simple configuration file. Instead of simulating a service, it is also possible to 
proxy it to another machine, even to the source. The different personalities 
simulate operating systems at TCP/IP stack level; this configured personality is 
the operating-system fingerprint that scanning tools like Nmap (Network Mapper) 
or Xprobe would return. 
Although Honeyd is considered a low-interaction honeypot, it has powerful 
features to run services through scripts that could be configured to go beyond 
simple port listening and give responses to intruders. In this way, we can 
increase the level of interaction of the honeypot. Honeyd can be used to create a 
virtual honeynet or for general network monitoring. It supports the creation of a 
 12 
virtual network topology, including dedicated routes and routers. The protocols 
can simulate latency and packet loss to make the topology seem more realistic. 
Honeyd software provides two types of logs that are useful to analyze. 
Network packet-level logging gives an overview or details of what kind of traffic 
the honeypots receive, and system logging gives more detailed information about 
the ongoing traffic. Honeyd can be used for two purposes: distracting potential 
hackers or catching them in a honeypot. Either way, the hackers will be slowed 
down and subjected to analysis. 
Unfortunately, Honeyd has not been updated recently and some features, 
like operating-systems fingerprinting, do not work well with the later versions of 
Nmap and Xprobe.  
1. Detection of Honeyd 
Honeyd software running on a computer, or the virtual hosts created by 
Honeyd, could be detected in several ways. 
One method is to flood one honeypot with pings or another CPU intensive 
process. This honeypot machine will use its resources to respond to this request, 
and as a consequence, all other simulated machines will become slower.  
Another possible method is related to time and latency. Apart from the fact 
that the responses in the simulated systems in the honeynet will always be a little 
slower than a real system, we could compare clock timestamps of several 
different components of the net. Normally, every computer will have a slightly 
different timestamp because their hardware is different. With Honeyd, the 
timestamps will be more consistent. 
Another way to detect Honeyd, is to analyze the responses of the 
machines to some uncommon packets and try to find discrepancies on the 
responses. For Honeyd, this happens when a TCP packet, with SYN and RST 
flags, is probed to an open port. Honeyd will send a reply, while most other 
machines will not.  
Another method to detect, and maybe attack, Honeyd is through packet 
fragmentation. This method exploits a vulnerability related to the way Honeyd 
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reassembles fragmented packets. Honeyd checks the source address, 
destination address, and identification number but not the protocol number. An 
adversary could send a carefully prepared fragmented packet with mixed 
protocols that when reassembled by Honeyd could produce a reply packet or 
execute some attack, whereas normal operating systems would just discard 
them. 
To prevent detection of Honeyd, countermeasures are periodically added 
to new versions of the software. For example, versions starting from 0.8 solved 
the clock timestamp problem by providing a different clock skew (timing 
difference) to each operating system and each virtual honeypot. Additionally, the 
wrong replies to TCP packets with SYN and RST flags are now patched. 
B. VMWARE 
VMware software provides a virtualized set of hardware to the guest 
operating system. VMware software virtualizes the hardware for a video adapter, 
a network adapter, and hard disk adapters to give the appearance of an x86 
hardware platform. This allows the installation of almost any operating system, 
while the host provides pass-through drivers for guest USB, serial, and parallel 
devices. In this way we could run, for example, a guest Linux OS over a 
Windows OS host.  
The virtualization capabilities of VMware software give us an easy way to 
develop a virtual high-interaction honeypot. 
 A disadvantage of VMware is that it is relatively easy to detect a VMware 
machine in several ways. 
By default, the MAC address of NIC will be 00:0C:29, 00:50:56, or 
00:05:69, the MAC addresses assigned to the vendor VMware by the IEEE. With 
these restrictions, if the attacker is in the same network, the MAC address will be 
immediately detected. 
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The names of IDE and SCSI devices (HD and CDROM) are clearly related 
to VMware: VMware Virtual IDE Hard Drive, NECVMWar VMware IDE CDER10, 
and VMware SCSI Controller.  
The PCI vendor string and device ID of video adapter, VMware Inc PCI 
Display Adapter, is visible. Finally, the I/O backdoor in port 0x5658 (22104 in 
decimal) that can be used to configure VMware during runtime is visible. 
1. Countermeasures against VMware Fingerprinting  
There are ways to prevent an attacker from easily detecting the VMware 
machine or a virtual environment. 
There are hex editors that could be used to edit the VMware binary file, 
“vmware-vmx.exe”. We could search for Virtual IDE Hard Drive or Virtual IDE 
CDROM, and change them to names more appropriate to hide the VMware 
application. In Linux, this can also be done automatically by using scripts that are 
made to patch VMware. One such script was made by Kostkya Kortchinsky, a 
member of the French Honeynet Project. This Linux script gives the option to 
change the name of the IDE devices (HD and CDROM), SCSI devices (HD and 
CDROM), PCI vendor and device ID of the video adapter, and the I/O backdoor 
used by VMware.  
An appropriate configuration of the OS could prevent the VM system from 
being fingerprinted and detected. For example, we need to give each virtual 
machine enough main memory to be credible, such as 512 MB or above. This 
change could be done through the VMware Virtual Machine Control Panel. Also, 
we should change VMware MAC address because the default MAC address 
assigned by VMware always starts with 00:0C:29, 00:50:56, or 00:05:69. 
 Operating systems or VMware provide a way to change the MAC address, 
but we need to be careful to match the numbers to an existing vendor that also is 




Snort is a free, cross-platform, open-source network intrusion prevention 
system and network intrusion detection system, created by Martin Roesch, a 
respected authority on intrusion detection and prevention technology. 
Snort’s network-based intrusion detection system has the ability to 
perform real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on Internet Protocol (IP) 
networks. Snort performs protocol analysis, content searching, and content 
matching. The program can also be used to detect probes or attacks, including 
operating system fingerprinting attempts, common gateway interface, buffer 
overflows, server message block probes, and stealth port scans. 
Snort can be configured in three main modes: sniffer, packet-logger, and 
network intrusion detection. In sniffer mode, the program will read network 
packets and display them on the console. In packet-logger mode, the program 
will log packets to the disk. In intrusion-detection mode, the program will monitor 
network traffic and analyze it against a defined set of rules. The program could 
then perform a specific action based on what has been identified.  
The rules we used to run Snort were the Sourcefire Vulnerability Research 
Team (VRT) rules, which are the official rules available for the program. We used 
the latest VRT rules that were available free to registered users, rules an average 
of 30 days old when released. 
The software provides a detailed alert log, which can be shown in different 
formats, like a text file or a pcap file, which store the packets associated with the 
alerts so they can be analyzed with software like Wireshark. 
D. WIRESHARK 
Wireshark is a free, open-source packet analyzer. It is used for network 
troubleshooting, analysis, software and communications protocol development, 
and education. This software was originally named Ethereal, but it was renamed 
Wireshark in May 2006. 
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Wireshark works in a similar way to tcpdump, but with a graphical front-
end, plus several sorting and filtering options.   
E. MICROSOFT LOG PARSER 
The Microsoft Log Parser is a powerful and very flexible command-line 
tool that provides universal query access to text-based data such as log files, 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) files, comma-separated values (CSV) files, 
and tab-separated values (TSV). It also provides universal query access to key 
data sources on the Windows operating system such as the Event Log, the 
Registry, the file system, and the Active Directory. The results of the query can 
be custom-formatted in text-based output, or they can be exported to targets like 
SQL, SYSLOG, or Excel. 
F. SECURITY ONION 
Security Onion is free distribution created by security expert Doug Burks, 
which could be either used as a LiveDVD or installed in the hard drive as a virtual 
machine. It contains software used for installing, configuring, and testing intrusion 
detection systems based on Xubuntu 10.04 Operating System and contains 
Snort, Suricata, Sguil, Xplico, Nmap, and many other security tools specially 
compiled for use in intrusion detection. According to its creator, the software is 
hardened for its security function. 
G. FEDORA 14 
Experiments were conducted in an operating system based on Red Hat 
Linux Fedora 14 (Laughlin). This was the last version available at the beginning 





IV.  METHODOLOGY 
A. OBJECTIVES 
 The objective of the main experiment was to deploy a honeynet easily 
accessible to the Internet, and which could be scanned and attacked. We tried to 
maximize the interaction with possible attackers, meaning to maximize the 
number, variety, and duration of attacks. If this is the case, then the honeypots 
are more successful and difficult to detect or avoid. To do this, machines were 
simulated using the software Honeyd. The analysis of the number of attacks on 
them can be compared with the attacks on other hosts of the network, giving us a 
good idea about how effective the honeypots created with this software were in 
hiding or protecting the real systems. 
We attempted to find the answers to the following questions: 
a) How did our simulated network look from the outside? 
b) Were the emulated operating systems well simulated by Honeyd? 
c) What attacks did the network receive? 
d) Did we receive more attacks using Honeyd than without? 
e) Did Honeyd attract attacks, diverting them from the real systems? 
f) Were there differences in the number or kinds of attacks between the 
emulated operating systems, protocols, ports, or services? 
g) Did the real laptop (Windows XP) and the VM (Fedora 14 or Security 
Onion) running Honeyd get compromised? 
h) What can we do to make the simulated hosts more credible? 





B. THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment was run at the Naval Postgraduate School campus using 
a single laptop running Windows XP as host; the laptop also ran first a Fedora 14 
Virtual Machine and later a Security Onion VM, both using VMware as guests. 
This laptop was connected by Ethernet to one port associated to a special 
network. This network, known as PacBell network (63.205.26.64/27), is a small 
network at NPS that is outside the protection of the main firewall. It has 32 IP 
addresses, of which around 10 of them are normally used. We used seven other 
IP addresses for this experiment, all of them monitored and working as 
honeypots. 
We used a hub to connect to the network because the experiment 
coexists with other tests and honeypots. One of the latter is a real host running 
Windows XP that can be considered part of our experiment, although it is 
production system.  
On the Windows machine we installed Snort 2.9 with the VRT rules. Snort 
was configured to log comma-separated values (CSV) files, and create tcpdump 
files for the alerts, which could be read with Wireshark. On the Fedora virtual 
machine we installed Honeyd 1.5c, which generated its own packet and system 
logs. At the beginning of the experiment and between every run, both machines 
were updated and patched to harden them against possible attacks. Snort was 
also updated when a new set of rules available for registered users was 
released. 
We tried different configurations, each of which ran for approximately one 
week. We used the following criteria to make changes: 
- In general, we went from simpler to more complex. 
- Using previous results, we discarded the less successful 
configurations in terms of amount of traffic and number and variety 
of alerts.  
- We changed the relation between IP addresses and the operating 
systems randomly.  
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- A couple of times we also ran the experiment without honeypots or 
even without the guest operating system to study the normal traffic 
on the network. 
 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the network architecture used in the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Network architecture. 
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C. SUMMARY OF CONFIGURATIONS USED 
In week 1 we ran only the host computer with the Snort IDS to have 
a baseline for the normal traffic of the monitored network.   
 
In week 2 we ran Honeyd in the guest virtual machine, mistakenly 
by default, for a long weekend. This meant that Honeyd ran 
claiming all the 32 addresses of the network. (Honeyd is much 
more aggressive than similar programs like LaBrea Tarpit in 
capturing IP addresses.) We noticed a great increase in the amount 
of traffic and alerts until the Ethernet connection was closed by the 
NPS Information Technology and Communications Services 
department because the experiment was producing IP address 
conflicts with the valid users of the network. 
 
In week 3, we ran Honeyd on the guest virtual machine claiming 
five addresses: three simulating Windows hosts and two simulating 
Linux hosts. Every host had a couple of open ports related with the 
operating system running—for example, NetBios ports (137, 138, 
139) open for Windows hosts or to simulate certain services, like 
port 80 open for HTTP or port 25 open for SMTP. 
To the set of virtual machines we added one running the Honeyd 
and one as the host for VMware.  
 
In week 4 we configured a more elaborate deception that included 
simulated services (some included in the software Honeyd and 
others downloaded from the Web page). In addition, we kept most 
of the open ports and used a more credible ports status. 
Two Windows OS computers were simulated and three with Linux 
OS. Every computer had several TCP and UDP open ports and 
some emulated services like SMTP, HTTP, FTP, SSH, Telnet, 
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NetBIOS, POP3, and IMAP. We also used the proxy function of 
Honeyd in a couple of ports to redirect the attacks to its source. 
 
In week 5, we used a configuration similar to the previous week but 
without the presence of the considered “production” host. 
 
In week 6, after noticing a decrease in the traffic and number of 
alerts of the previous configuration, we made some changes to it. 
Thinking that in some way attackers could be deceived, the IP 
address of the VM host was switched with that of one of the 
honeypots. This machine was changed to a Security Onion suite 
instead of Fedora 14 because it was supposed to have better 
monitoring capabilities and be hardened against possible attacks. 
The rest of the configuration was similar to the previous week. 
 
In week 7, although the number of alerts did not increase 
significantly, we continued with a similar configuration with respect 
to the previous week, with several scripts running on each host.  
 
In week 8, due to the clear difference in the amount of interactions 
with emulated Windows and Linux operating systems, we emulated 
only the Microsoft Windows OS. Analysis of the results so far 
showed us that not-credible emulated services are probably worse 
than simulated open ports; as a consequence, we tried again with 
only open ports and no services running. 
 
In week 9, considering the good results obtained in week 8, we 
continued with a similar port configuration using four of what 
appeared to be the most successful scripts. 
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In week 10 we ran the experiment without Honeyd to check again 
the normal behavior of the network. 
 
In week 11 we ran the experiment without Honeyd and even 
without the guest virtual machine (like week 1, with better tools for 
analysis), to check again the traffic in the network. 
 
In week 12 we ran Honeyd with the same configuration as week 9. 
 
In week 13 we continued the same previous configuration, adding a 
Perl script with a fake Telnet server in port 23 on host .79, and 
using the newly created personalities for Windows Server 2008 and 
Windows XP Service Pack 3. 
 
In week 14 we tried the last control run without Honeyd running. 
 
In week 15 we used the same configuration as week 13, but we 
replaced the fake Telnet server with a fake internal Web server in 
maintenance status and we included the proxy function in port 445 
in one honeypot, in order to send back to the source every packet 
the virtual host receives in this port. Also, we switched the IP 
addresses of four honeypots. 
 
A detailed configuration for every week is available in Appendix A. 
D. METHODOLOGY TO ANALYZE THE RESULTS 
Every week, we made a quick analysis of all the information available, 
using some programs and tools to assist us. At the end of the study, we made a 
more detailed review.  
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As we learned what worked and what did not, we used different logs, 
scripts, tools, and software to better analyze the information captured. This 
approach required some changes in the methodology and log formats, and as a 
result, there was a significant difference in the amount of work and information 
available between the first and last weeks. 
We noticed that some of the default formats of the logs are not easy to 
order or parse for analysis, such as the text alert logs created by Snort. 
Therefore, we chose the comma-separated values (CSV) format for Snort alerts. 
Every week we collected the following logs: Snort summary (displayed on 
the screen) in a text file, Snort alerts in CSV format, Snort alerts in PCAP format, 
Honeyd packet logging in text format, and Honeyd system logging in text format. 
To analyze Snort alerts, we used Microsoft Log Parser 2.2 in conjunction 
with scripts in SQL language and HTML templates, to display the alerts in a more 
friendly way using Web pages. We used some code samples from Giuseppini [5]. 
For Honeyd logs we also used Microsoft Log Parser 2.  
We created “analysis.bat,” a small batch program using Log Parser which 
creates a CSV file with the column headers included. It generates several files 
and folders by calling six SQL query scripts that produce results in HTML 
template format. The results of the queries are:  
Alerts index: an HTML file that counts the different alerts and displays 
them in descending order of count. 
Alerts details: a folder with an HTML file for every different type of Snort 
alert. Each file displays in HTML format the information related to the 
corresponding alert. 
Source index: an HTML file that lists the different source IP addresses and 
displays them in descending order of count. 
Source details: a folder with an HTML file for each source IP address 
related to a Snort alert. Each file displays in HTML format the information related 
to the corresponding source IP address. 
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Destination index: an HTML file that lists the different destination IP 
addresses and displays them in descending order of count. 
 Destination details: a folder with an HTML file for each destination IP 
address related to a Snort alert. Each file displays in HTML format the 
information related to the corresponding destination IP address. 
We also created “graph_analysis.bat,” a small batch program for Log 
Parser that generates graphs for several kinds of information: top alerts, top 
source IPs, top destination IP, alerts per hour, top source port, top destination 
port, and top protocol. 
To analyze Honeyd logs, we create “honeyd_log_analysis.bat,” another 
script in Log Parser. It parses the text file “honeyd.log” related to Honeyd packet 
logging, generating a CSV file that sets the column name headers to view and 
process using Excel. This file was useful because it allowed us to see how 
relatively effective the honeypots were. This was in relation to the interactions 
they had with other IP addresses, not necessarily alerts or attacks—in other 
words, the amount of traffic they could attract. With this method, we could quickly 
compare different honeypot configurations. 
The code and a sample of the results are included as appendices. 
With the help of these tools and programs we obtained several statistical 
values related to the traffic, number of alerts, type of alerts, protocols, and 
relevant times, all of which gave us much useful information. 
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V.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
A. THE EXPERIMENT VIEWED FROM THE OUTSIDE 
If an attacker scans the network that we set up for this experiment from 
the outside it is easily identifiable as a government or education resource. 
Executing a traceroute to any host in the network would show that the name of 
the last router is clearly associated with the Naval Postgraduate School (see 
Figure 2). This situation could either deter hackers or increase their interest. But 
the transparent routeraddress should be easy to fix in other deployments. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Execution of traceroute from the outside on one IP address of the 
network 
B. HONEYD AS A HONEYPOT 
After analysis of the data obtained in weeks 1, 10, 11, and 14, without 
Honeyd running, we estimated the baseline behavior of the network—the normal 






 week 1 week 10 week 11 week 14 
Number of packets 438661 618723 541740 518659 
Number of alerts 388 1325 756 488 
Different alerts 4 13 16 5 
ICMP alerts 388 757 476 488 
TCP alerts 0 568 270 0 
UDP alerts 0 0 10 0 
Table 3.   Statistics of alerts in weeks without Honeyd running 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show corresponding data for weeks when Honeyd was 
running. 
 
 week 3 week 4 week 5 week 6 week 7 
Number of 
packets 1191410 1313693 701771 906893 740769 
Number of 
alerts 8589 259776 2525 2823 6686 
Different 
alerts 24 36 12 17 11 
ICMP alerts 8366 255744 1940 2176 2990 
TCP alerts 218 4016 584 647 3696 
UDP alerts 5 16 1 0 0 
Table 4.   Statistics of alerts in weeks 3–7 with Honeyd running 
 
 week 8 week 9 week 12 week 13 week 15 
Number of 
packets 897552 951556 995235 807712 1066743 
Number of 
alerts 3386 2957 2526 3711 4694 
Different 
alerts 14 19 10 15 14 
ICMP alerts 2144 2651 2270 3445 3082 
TCP alerts 1242 306 256 266 1612 
UDP alerts 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5.   Statistics of alerts in weeks 8–15 with Honeyd running 
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Comparing these two tables, we see a significant increase (approximately 
40%) in the number of packets in the network when Honeyd was running. Also, 
the total number of alerts increased several times and the number of different 
alerts was greater. Given these statistics, we can say that Honeyd increases both 
the amount of traffic and the amount of malicious traffic on a network, confirming 
that the software is useful for research purposes. 
Another way to analyze how successful Honeyd and its different 
configurations are at changing attacker behavior is by comparing the number of 
conversations—the traffic between two specific endpoints—produced only by 
Honeyd, as obtained from its packet log (see Table 6). We can see that with the 
exception of week 6, the configurations generated significant traffic, with between 





week 4  46124 
week 5  14078 
week 6  5226 
week 7  13676 
week 8  26827 
week 9  49818 
week 12  40950 
week 13 35244 
week 15 41118 
Table 6.   Number of Honeyd interactions per week 
 
A more detailed view of the degree of success of each weekly 
configuration was obtained from the packet log file (Table 7). We can also see 
that some honeypots had significantly more conversations than others. In this 
case, honeypots .77 and .80 had several times more interactions than honeypots 




 week 4 TCP UDP week 4 ICMP 
Honeypot .73 4525 99 
Honeypot .74 1720 121 
Honeypot .77 18945 371 
Honeypot .79 1725 94 
Honeypot .80 18283 188 
Table 7.   Number of Honeyd interactions by honeypots in week 4 
 
On the contrary, in week 6 we can see that some honeypots were 
definitively not successful. We can see in Table 8 that three honeypots were 
completely unsuccessful and only two showed significant interactions. 
 
 week 6 TCP UDP week 6 ICMP 
Honeypot .70 0 0 
Honeypot .73 0 4 
Honeypot .74 1247 68 
Honeypot .77 0 0 
Honeypot .79 3755 118 
Table 8.   Number of Honeyd interactions by honeypots in week 6 
C. SNORT ALERTS 
During the experiment the signature-based network intrusion detection 
system Snort, running in the host OS, generated alerts for the attacks received in 
the network. The number and diversity of alerts changed every week; moreover 
even with the same configuration there were significant changes. A summary of 










NetBIOS SMB-DS repeated logon failure 7996 
Shellcode NOOP 2388 
P2P BitTorrent transfer 2364 
POLICY remote desktop protocol attempted administrator conn. request 1259 
Specific threats ASN.1 constructed bit string 603 
NetBIOS SMB-DS Unicode max param overflow attempt 84 
NetBIOS DCERPC canonicalize overflow attempt 81 
NetBIOS DCERPC remote create instance attempt 27 
Web-client Portable executable binary transfer 17 
Web-client obfuscated Javascript excessive from CharCode 10 
Table 9.   Summary of top 10 alerts in the experiment 
 
The most common alert—plus three others included in the top 10—was 
related to NetBIOS. These alerts appeared in bursts and only in half of the weeks 
the experiments were running. An important alert that appeared almost every 
week was the Shellcode NOOP. This alert was associated with several different 
Snort signature identification numbers, which means different types of buffer 
overflow attacks were injecting null operations. Other alerts meriting mention 
were the attempts to connect to the honeypots and other hosts with remote 
desktop protocol and the constructed bit string heap corruption. 
D. PORT USAGE 
To create a useful honeypot configuration, both for research and decoy 
purposes, it is necessary to manage the ports. During our experiment, the ports 
<1024 that were most probed and attacked were in decreasing order of 
frequency 445, 80, 135, 139, 53 and 22. Port 445, Microsoft-DS (Directory 
Services) Active Directory, was by far the port most attacked during the 
experiment with 95.32 % of the TCP protocol alerts. In a distant second place 
appears port 80, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) port with 3.25% of the 
same kind of alerts. Also appearing were port 135, Microsoft Endpoint Mapper 
(also known as DCE/RPC locator service) with 0.84%, and port 139, NetBIOS 
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Session Service with 0.34%. Thus it is strongly recommended that port 445 be 
open in any Windows honeypot configuration, along with ports 80, 135, and 139.   
E. OPERATING SYSTEMS MORE ATTACKED 
Given that the operating systems emulated by Honeyd were not detected 
correctly by fingerprinting tools like Nmap (see Appendix C for details), we 
cannot say that emulated Windows hosts received more attacks than emulated 
Linux hosts because of their operating system. The main reason why emulated 
Windows operating systems received more attacks than Linux is that the port 
most attacked, 445, is a Windows operating-system service. 
F. SERVICE SCRIPTS 
One of the most interesting features of Honeyd is its capability to run 
scripts associated with ports as specified in the Honeyd configuration file. These 
scripts can improve a decoy to keep the attacker busy interacting with the 
honeypot for a longer period of time. The degree of success of our scripts was 
diverse due to two factors. First, as we can see in the high number of alerts in 
week 4, there was some effect related to the appearance of “new” services 
(something similar occurred with “new” hosts) that were quickly probed and 
scanned. Within a short time, between one and two weeks depending on the 
script, this novelty effect was lost—as is evident in weeks 5 and 6. We can 
conclude that a script will have a decreasing degree of success if it is repeated 
for several weeks.  
Secondly, services that were not credible because they were old, had 
errors, or were not logical according to the host’s configuration, were quickly 
recognized by attackers who then avoided the honeypot. We can see this 
happening in week 6, where the same configuration had been running for three 
weeks. This identification process took less time as compared with the novelty 
effect. Hence, for research and decoy purposes, it was better to keep the port 
open instead of running a non-credible script—as in weeks 8 and 9 (weeks with a 
small number of scripts but many ports open).  
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A weakness that also has to be considered is that service scripts could 
make the operating system running Honeyd more vulnerable to attacks.    
G. POSSIBLE COMPROMISE IN THE SYSTEMS RUNNING THE 
HONEYPOTS 
During the experiment we did not find evidence of compromise of the 
systems running the honeypots, either in the host OS or the guest OS. The 
routine update and patching done to the operating systems and antivirus 
signatures on these hosts probably helped. 
H. HONEYD AS A DECOY 
To analyze the usefulness of the Honeyd framework as a decoy in a 
production environment, we can compare the alerts in production hosts (normal 
users of the network) with the alerts in the honeypots. This includes the Windows 
XP running Snort and VMware, and the virtual machine running Honeyd. Our 
goal was to find evidence that suggests that a significant number of alerts have 
migrated from production hosts to members of the honeynet. 
To do this, we checked the statistics of weeks without Honeyd running: In 
week 1, 56% of the alerts were on production hosts and 44% in the Windows XP 
host honeypot. In week 10, 80.7% of the alerts were on production hosts and 
19.3% in honeypots. In week 11, 89.5% were on production systems and only 
10.5% were on the only honeypot running, the Windows XP host.  
To do the same analysis for the weeks where Honeyd was running, we 
have to discard week 2 because, as a consequence of an error in configuration, 
we cannot distinguish between the production host and the honeypots in a 
reliable manner during that week. 
In Tables 10 and 11 we can see a significant decrease in the percentage 
of alerts on production hosts with Honeyd running. There is a notable exception 
in week 4, which had the highest number of alerts for any week and also the 
highest number of different alerts, which undoubtedly affected the statistics. 
Week 4 also had the highest percentage of alerts generated in the production 
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hosts. How can we explain these contradictory values? As discussed earlier, a 
configuration with many ports open and dozens of service scripts running was 
very interesting for attackers; consequently, it was repeatedly probed and 
attacked. While this situation is good for research purposes, a very tempting 
network would attract hundreds of attackers that Honeyd as a decoy cannot 
deceive appropriately. This is true at least with a small number of honeypots, 
since the production hosts, in practice, will receive much more attacks than 
without these decoys. In other words, a good configuration as honeypot would 
not be good as a decoy. 
 
Percentage 
of alerts week 3 week 4 week 5 week 6 week 7 
Production 
hosts 
4.37769 92.6552 10.1782 9.28091 4.816 
Honeypots  95.6223 7.34479 89.8218 90.7191 95.184 
Table 10.   Percentage of alerts in production hosts and honeypots with Honeyd 




of alerts week 8 week 9 week 12 week 13 week 15 
Production 
hosts 11.636 15.996 9.18448 7.78766 5.66681 
Honeypots 88.364 84.004 90.8155 92.2123 94.3332 
Table 11.   Percentage of alerts in production hosts and honeypots with Honeyd 
running in weeks 8–15 
 
The rest of the weeks appeared promising for decoy purposes, showing 
us that more than 80% of the alerts occurred on honeypots instead of production 
systems. Tables 12 and 13 provide a more detailed analysis of Honeyd. It shows 
us the percentage of alerts in dividing honeypots into three categories: the host 
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running Windows XP and VMware, the guest running Fedora 14 or Security 
Onion, and the honeypots created by Honeyd. We can see that in weeks like 3 
and 6, with a high percentage of alerts in honeypots, they were concentrated in 
the host and guest—a situation not completely desirable because these 
machines are more vulnerable than the virtual honeypots created by Honeyd. 
Discarding week 4, the rest of the weeks show that more than 40% of the alerts 
were on Honeyd virtual honeypots, with numbers as high as 62.8% in week 9, 




week 3 week 4 week 5 week 6 week 7 
Host 72.7209 4.30371 9.82178 12.4336 4.2178 
Guest 16.8006 1.48782 38.8911 56.3585 48.564 
Honeyd 
honeypots 
6.10083 1.55326 41.1089 21.927 42.402 
Production 
hosts 
4.37769 92.6552 10.1782 9.28091 4.816 
Table 12.   Detailed percentage of alerts in production hosts and honeypots with 














Host 7.2652 10.213 10.6097 8.40744 4.55901 
 
Guest 30.892 10.991 26.7221 40.7976 49.8722 
Honeyd 
honeypots 
50.207 62.8 53.4838 43.0073 39.902 
Production 
hosts 
11.636 15.996 9.18448 7.78766 5.66681 
Table 13.   Detailed percentage of alerts in production hosts and honeypots with 
Honeyd running in weeks 8–15 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Honeyd showed itself to be a useful tool for research on attacks. It 
increased the amount of traffic in the network by approximately 40%, and by 
several times the number of alerts available for study.  
Honeyd effectively simulated the status of the ports (open, closed, or 
filtered) and appeared to associate them properly to scripts. However, Honeyd 
failed to create virtual hosts with a credible emulated operating system because 
the program was designed for the first-generation Nmap software and has not 
been updated. The attempts to mitigate this problem were only partially 
successful; therefore, we had to rely on only the port configuration to simulate 
different operating systems. 
Some of the scripts used were successful to attract many different 
attackers, but only for a short time. Others were not so successful or lost their 
initial success quickly. We found two probable reasons for this behavior: The 
scripts were either not elaborated enough and were easily discovered as 
deceptions by sophisticated attackers, or Honeyd, as a low-interaction honeypot, 
has a clear limit in producing credible interactions with attackers.  
The ports most attacked with Honeyd were 445 (Microsoft-DS), 80 
(HTTP), 135, and 139. This suggests that these ports should be supported in any 
honeypot configuration for an adequate level of interaction with attackers. Ports 
445, 135, and 139 are related to Windows operating systems, and hence 
produced more attacks for virtual hosts simulating Windows than the Linux 
operating system. 
The most common attacks received in the honeypots were related to 
NetBIOS and to Shellcode NOOPs (buffer overflows). Other significant attacks 
were the attempts to connect to the honeypots and other hosts with a remote-
desktop protocol and the constructed bit string heap corruption. However, we did 
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not find symptoms or evidence of successful attacks or compromise in the host 
running Windows XP, nor did we find it in the guest system running Fedora 14 or 
Security Onion Ubuntu. In general, we found that the honeypots received scans 
and basic attacks, without showing that advanced attack techniques were used. 
The use of the software Microsoft Log Parser with sql and tlp scripts 
appeared to be a useful and flexible tool for analyzing Snort alerts in Windows 
machines. 
Honeyd appeared also to be useful as a decoy to distract attackers from 
more valuable targets, but it must be carefully configured to achieve good results. 
Some configurations with many open ports and scripts running were useful as a 
research honeypot, but not as a decoy. Good configurations for decoys must 
have a limited number of scripts and open ports, enough to make the decoys 
attractive, but not so many as to make the entire network more attractive to 
attackers. When this situation happened, the normal users of the network—i.e., 
the hosts that were intended to be protected by the decoys—were attacked 
considerably more than usual. But decoys, as in conventional warfare, have a 
limited useful life. They must be used at the right time. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
We suggest the following future investigations: 
• Modify Honeyd to allow second-generation operating-system 
detection (this could be done by modifying the file “personality.c”) 
and run the experiment again. 
• Run the experiment with more IP addresses available, so Honeyd 
can simulate more virtual hosts as honeypots. 
• Modify or create scripts that can deceive attackers for a longer 
period of time. We suggest elaborated fake Web servers, with a 
credible degree of interaction during the navigation on the Web site. 
This should be complemented with messages about restrictions to 
navigate in some pages, login windows, and banners, encouraging 
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unauthorized users to close the page. Mail servers and file-transfer 
servers could also be simulated. 
• Try a similar experiment with other software, such as Nepenthes or 
its successor Dionaea, to deploy low-interaction honeypots.  
• Experiment with high-interaction honeypots based in virtualization 
software like VMware or User-mode Linux (UML). 
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APPENDIX A. DETAILS OF THE CONFIGURATIONS USED BY WEEK 
Week 1: 
We ran the laptop with the host operating system (Windows XP) in IP address 
.68 with the Snort IDS running, to get a baseline of the normal traffic and alerts of 
the monitored network. 
 
Week 2: 
We ran Honeyd for a long weekend, claiming (by mistake) all the 32 addresses of 
the network. Honeyd is more aggressive than similar programs like LaBrea Tarpit 
in claiming IP addresses.  
 
Week 3: 
We ran Honeyd in the guest operating system (Fedora 14), claiming 5 IP 
addresses: 
• .73  “Microsoft Windows 98 SP2”  with TCP ports 135,137,139, and 9898 
open. 
• .74  “Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1” with TCP ports 135, 137, 
139 and 443 open. 
• .77  “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with TCP ports 80, 137, 
and 139 open. 
• .79  “OpenBSD 3.3” with TCP and UDP port 421 open.  
• .80 “FreeBSD 4.7-RELEASE” with TCP and UDP port 4448 open. Default 
TCP action tarpit open. 
To these five virtual machines we had to add the .70 guest operating system 
running the Honeyd and .68 as the host operating system for VMware. The latter 






We made a more elaborate configuration for the same IP addresses that 
included simulated services (some included in the software Honeyd and others 
downloaded from the Honeyd Web page) and more credible ports status. 
• .73 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with TCP ports 21, 25, 
80, 110, 137, 138, 139, 143, 389, 445, and 5901, and UDP ports 161, 137, 
138, and 445 open and running simulated services using scripts. 
• .74 “Linux 2.4.7 (X86)” with TCP ports 21, 22, 23, 25, 79, 80, 110, 143, 
515, 3128 , 8080, and 8081, and UDP ports 53, 161, and 514 open and 
running simulated services using scripts 
• .77 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with the same 
configuration as week 3 but with a script on TCP port 80 and TCP port 
8080 open.  
• .79 “Linux 2.2.12 - 2.2.19” with TCP ports 22, 23, 25, 79, 80, 110, 143, 
515, 3128 , 8080, and 8081, and UDP ports 53, 161, and 514 open and 
running simulated services using scripts. 
• .80 “FreeBSD 4.7-RELEASE” using the same configuration as in week 3. 
 
Week 5: 
This week the configuration was the same as the previous week.  
 
Week 6: 
In this week we made some important changes to the configuration of the 
experiment: We changed the guest operating system to .80 instead of the 
previously used IP address .70. As a consequence, the honeypot with FreeBSD 
emulated operating system was moved to IP address .70. The VM guest 
operating system was changed to a Security Onion suite instead of Fedora 14 
because it is supposed to have better capabilities for monitoring and be 
hardened against possible attacks. 
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• .70 “FreeBSD 4.7-RELEASE” using the same previous configuration for 
this operating system. 
• .73 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with TCP ports 21, 25, 
80, 110, 137, 138, 139, 143, 389, 445, and 5901, and UDP ports 161, 137, 
138, and 445 open and running simulated services using scripts. 
• .74 “Linux 2.4.7 (X86)” with TCP ports 21, 22, 23, 25, 79, 80, 110, 143, 
515, 3128, 8080, and 8081, and UDP ports 53, 161, and 514 open and 
running simulated services using scripts 
• .77 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6” with the same 
configuration as week 3 but with a script on TCP port 80 and TCP port 
8080 open. 
• .79 “Linux 2.2.12 - 2.2.19” with TCP ports 22, 23, 25, 79, 80, 110, 143, 
515, 3128 , 8080, and 8081, and UDP ports 53, 161, and 514 open and 
running simulated services using scripts.  
• .80 Security Onion guest operating system running honeyd. 
 
Week 7: 
On week 7 the configuration was the following: 
• .70 “Linux 2.4.7 (X86)” with TCP ports 21, 22, 23, 25, 79, 80, 110, 143, 
515, 3128, 8080, 8081, and UDP ports 53, 161, and 514 open and running 
simulated services using scripts 
• .73 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with TCP port 80 
(HTTP) running a service script; TCP ports 137, 139, 443, and 8080 open; 
and UDP ports 135 and 137. 
• .74 “Linux 2.4.7 (X86)” with TCP port 23 (Telnet) and TCP port 79 
(Name/finger protocol) with scripts running and the UDP port open. 
• .77 the same as .70 
• .79 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with ports TCP 21, 25, 
80, 110, 137, 138, 139, 143, 389, 445, and 5901, and UDP ports 161, 137, 
138, and 445 open and running simulated services using scripts. 
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Week 8: 
In this week, due to the clear difference in the number of interactions between 
the Windows and Linux operating systems, we configured only Windows. 
Analysis of the results thus far showed us that not-credible emulated services are 
probably worse than simulated only-open ports; as a consequence, we tried 
again with open ports instead of simulated services. 
The configuration was the following: 
• .70 “Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1” with TCP ports 135, 139, 
and 445 open, and UDP ports 135, 137, 138, 445, and 4500 open. 
• .73 “Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition” with TCP ports 20, 
21, 25, 80, 135, 139, and 445 open, and UDP ports 53, 135, 137, 138, and 
445 open. 
• .74 “Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1” with TCP ports 135, 139, 
and 445 open, and UDP ports 135, 137, 138, 445, and 4500 open. 
• .77 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6”  with TCP ports 80, 135, 
139, 443, 445, and 8080 open, and UDP ports 135, 137, 138, and 445 
open. 
• .79  “Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition” with TCP ports 




On week 9 the configuration was the following: 
• .70 “Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1” with TCP ports 135, 139, 
and 445 open, and UDP ports 135, 137, 138, 445, and 4500 open. 
• .73 “Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition” with TCP ports 20, 
21, 25, 80, 135, 139, and 445 open, and UDP ports 53, 135, 137, 138, and 
445 open. Scripts were running in ports 21 (FTP), 25 (SMTP), and 110 
(POP3). 
 43 
• .74 “Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1” with TCP ports 135, 139, 
and 445 open, and UDP ports 135, 137, 138, 445, and 4500 open. 
• .77 “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6 with TCP ports 80, 135, 
139, 445, and 8080 open, and UDP ports 135, 137, 138, and 445. Perl 
script running in TCP port 80 (HTTP). 
• .79 “Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition” with TCP ports 




We ran the experiment without Honeyd to check the normal behavior of the 
network in a different time period. 
 
Week 11: 
We ran the experiment without Honeyd, this time even without the guest virtual 
machine (as in week 1, although with better tools for analysis), to check again the 
traffic in the network. 
 
Week 12: 
Due to the previous week’s promising results, we repeated the same 
configuration as week 9. 
 
Week 13: 
We continued the same previous week configuration, adding a Perl script with a 
fake Telnet server in port 23 on host .79, and using the newly created 
personalities for Windows Server 2008 and Windows XP Service Pack 3. 
 
Week 14: 





We used the same configuration as week 13, but we replaced the fake Telnet 
server with a fake internal web server in maintenance status, and we included 
the proxy function in port 445 in one honeypot (.77), in order to send back to the 
source every packet the virtual host receives in this port. We also switched the IP 
addresses of 4 honeypots. 
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APPENDIX B. COMMANDS, CONFIGURATION, AND CODE USED 
A. COMMANDS USED 
Snort was run in a Windows XP laptop with these instructions in the command 
line: 
 
Snort.exe –dev –i2 –y –c C:\Snort\etc\snort.conf –l C:\Snort\log 
 
-dev: Tells Snort to display the packet data, decode data link layer headers and 
be verbose. Sometimes this switch was not used. 
-i2: Tells Snort which interface has to be monitored. 
-y: Tells Snort to include the year in the timestamp format. It is necessary to be 
compatible with Microsoft Log Parser. 
-c: Designates the configuration file and location that Snort uses. 
-l: Creates a log file in the indicated location and according to the format selected 
in the configuration file. 
 
Honeyd was run in a Fedora 14 VM and a Security Onion VM with this command 
in the terminal: 
 
honeyd –d –f /home/user/Desktop/honeyd.conf –l 
/home/user/Desktop/honeyd.log –s /home/user/Desktop/honeyd_syslog.log 
 
-d: This switch tells Honeyd not to daemonize and display verbose messages of 
the activities that it is doing. 
-f: Specifies the configuration file that Honeyd uses.  
-l: Creates packet-level log file in the indicated location. 
-s: Creates service-level log file in the indicated location. 
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B. HONEYD CONFIGURATION FILE 
This file is one of the most important files of Honeyd. On it we define the network 
configuration, the emulated operating systems, the status of ports and the 
services running. 
For example, the configuration file for Honeyd during week 9 was the following: 
 
### Configuration for week 9 
 
route entry 63.205.26.65 
 
route 63.205.26.65 link 63.205.26.70/32 
route 63.205.26.65 link 63.205.26.73/32 
route 63.205.26.65 link 63.205.26.74/32 
route 63.205.26.65 link 63.205.26.77/32 
route 63.205.26.65 link 63.205.26.79/32 
 
### Windows NT4 web server 
create windows 
set windows personality “Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6” 
add windows tcp port 80 “perl 
/home/erwin/Desktop/honeyd_services_scripts/iisemulator-0.95/iisemul8.pl” 
add windows udp port 135 open 
add windows tcp port 135 open 
add windows udp port 137 open 
add windows udp port 138 open 
add windows tcp port 139 open 
add windows tcp port 443 open 
add windows udp port 445 open 
add windows tcp port 445 open 
add windows tcp port 8080 open 
set windows default tcp action reset 
set windows default udp action reset 
set windows uptime 168939 
set windows droprate in 4 
 
### Windows SQL Server 
create windowsSQL 
set windowsSQL personality “Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition” 
add windowsSQL tcp port 135 open 
add windowsSQL udp port 135 open 
add windowsSQL udp port 137 open 
add windowsSQL udp port 138 open 
add windowsSQL tcp port 139 open 
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add windowsSQL tcp port 445 open 
add windowsSQL udp port 445 open 
add windowsSQL udp port 1434 open 
add windowsSQL tcp port 1433 open 
set windowsSQL default tcp action reset 
set windowsSQL default udp action reset 
set windowsSQL ethernet “intel” 
 
### Windows 2003 Server 
create windows2003 
set windows2003 personality “Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition” 
add windows2003 tcp port 20 open 
add windows2003 tcp port 21 “sh 
/home/erwin/Desktop/honeyd_services_scripts/ftp.sh” 
add windows2003 tcp port 25 “sh 
/home/erwin/Desktop/honeyd_services_scripts/smtp.sh” 
add windows2003 udp port 53 open 
add windows2003 tcp port 80 open 
add windows2003 tcp port 110 “sh 
/home/erwin/Desktop/honeyd_services_scripts/pop3.sh” 
add windows2003 udp port 110 open 
add windows2003 tcp port 135 open 
add windows2003 udp port 135 open 
add windows2003 udp port 137 open 
add windows2003 udp port 138 open 
add windows2003 tcp port 139 open 
add windows2003 tcp port 445 open 
add windows2003 udp port 445 open 
set windows2003 default tcp action reset 
set windows2003 default udp action reset 
set windows2003 uptime 147239 
set windows2003 droprate in 8 
set windows2003 ethernet “00:24:E8:A3:d2:f1” 
 
### Windows XP 
create windowsXP 
set windowsXP personality “Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1” 
add windowsXP tcp port 135 open 
add windowsXP udp port 135 open 
add windowsXP udp port 137 open 
add windowsXP udp port 138 open 
add windowsXP tcp port 139 open 
add windowsXP tcp port 445 open 
add windowsXP udp port 445 open 
add windowsXP udp port 4500 open 
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set windowsXP default tcp action reset 
set windowsXP default udp action reset 
set windowsXP ethernet “00:24:E8:23:d0:4f” 
 
 
bind 63.205.26.70 windowsXP 
bind 63.205.26.73 windows2003 
bind 63.205.26.74 windowsXP 
bind 63.205.26.77 windows 
bind 63.205.26.79 windowsSQL 
 
This file specifies for Honeyd: the default gateway (route entry), the IP addresses 
available to create virtual hosts, several different hosts with particular 
characteristics in relation to its emulated operating system, TCP and UDP ports 
open, ports with services scripts running, default action in other ports, time the 
host is up, packet drop rate, MAC addresses and which IP address is assigned to 
each host. 
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C. SCRIPTS AND CODE USED 
















































LogParser -i:CSV -o:CSV -headerRow:off -iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -
iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv “SELECT* INTO report/alertfin1.csv FROM 
alert.csv” 
LogParser file:alerts_index.sql -i:CSV -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:tpl -tpl:alerts_index.tpl 
LogParser file:alerts_detail.sql -i:CSV -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:tpl -tpl:alerts_detail.tpl 
LogParser file:srcip_index.sql -i:CSV -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:tpl -tpl:srcip_index.tpl 
LogParser file:srcip_detail.sql -i:CSV -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:tpl -tpl:srcip_detail.tpl 
LogParser file:dstip_index.sql -i:CSV -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:tpl -tpl:dstip_index.tpl 
LogParser file:dstip_detail.sql -i:CSV -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:tpl -tpl:dstip_detail.tpl 
 
AlertHeader.csv (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
timestamp, sig_generator, sig_id, sig_rev, msg, proto, src, srcport, dst, dstport, ethsrc, 
ethdst, ethlen, tcpflags, tcpseq, tcpack, tcplen, tcpwindow, ttl, tos, id, dgmlen, iplen, 
icmptype, icmpcode, icmpid, icmpseq 
 




 COUNT(msg) as Alerts 
INTO report\alerts.html 
FROM alert.csv 
GROUP BY msg, sig_id 
ORDER BY Alerts DESC 
 




  <meta http-equiv=“Content-Type” content=“text/html; charset=windows-
1252”> 
  <link rel=“stylesheet” type=“text/css” href=“snort.css”> 




 <p><h1>Snort Alerts Summary</h1><br/> 
 <i>Created %SYSTEM_TIMESTAMP% </i></p> 
  <table border=“0” width=“75%” cellspacing=“2”> 
  <tr> 
   <th><b>Signature</b></th> 
   <th><b>Message</b></th> 
   <th><b>Alerts</b></th> 
  </tr> 
</LPHEADER> 
<LPBODY> 
  <tr> 
   <td><a 
href=http://www.snort.org/search/>&nbsp;%sig_id%</a></td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%msg%</td> 
   <td><a href=alert\%sig_id%.html>&nbsp;%Alerts%</a></td> 









Alerts-Detail.sql (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
SELECT 
 sig_id, 
 TO_DATE(timestamp) AS Date, 




























Alerts-Detail.tpl (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
<LPHEADER> 
  <table border=“0” width=“140%” cellspacing=“2”> 
  <tr> 
   <th><b>date</b></th> 
   <th><b>time</b></th> 
   <th><b>proto</b></th> 
   <th><b>src</b></th> 
   <th><b>srcport</b></th> 
   <th><b>dst</b></th> 
   <th><b>dstport</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethsrc</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethdst</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethlen</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpflags</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpseq</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpack</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcplen</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpwindow</b></th> 
   <th><b>ttl</b></th> 
   <th><b>tos</b></th> 
   <th><b>id</b></th> 
   <th><b>dgmlen</b></th> 
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   <th><b>iplen</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmptype</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpcode</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpid</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpseq</b></th> 
  </tr> 
</LPHEADER> 
<LPBODY> 
  <tr> 
   <td>&nbsp;%date%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%time%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%proto%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;<a href=..\src\%src%.html>%src%</a></td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%srcport%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;<a href=..\dst\%dst%.html>%dst%</a></td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%dstport%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethsrc%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethdst%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethlen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpflags%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpseq%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpack%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcplen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpwindow%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ttl%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tos%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%id%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%dgmlen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%iplen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmptype%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpcode%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpid%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpseq%</td> 










srcip-detail.sql (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
SELECT 
 src, 
 TO_DATE(timestamp) AS Date, 



























srcip-detail.tpl (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
<LPHEADER> 
  <table border=“0” width=“140%” cellspacing=“2”> 
  <tr> 
   <th><b>date</b></th> 
   <th><b>time</b></th> 
   <th><b>proto</b></th> 
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   <th><b>sig_id</b></th> 
   <th><b>srcport</b></th> 
   <th><b>dst</b></th> 
   <th><b>dstport</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethsrc</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethdst</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethlen</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpflags</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpseq</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpack</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcplen</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpwindow</b></th> 
   <th><b>ttl</b></th> 
   <th><b>tos</b></th> 
   <th><b>id</b></th> 
   <th><b>dgmlen</b></th> 
   <th><b>iplen</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmptype</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpcode</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpid</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpseq</b></th> 
  </tr> 
</LPHEADER> 
<LPBODY> 
  <tr> 
   <td>&nbsp;%date%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%time%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%proto%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%sig_id%</td>  
   <td>&nbsp;%srcport%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%dst%</td>  
   <td>&nbsp;%dstport%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethsrc%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethdst%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethlen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpflags%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpseq%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpack%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcplen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpwindow%</td> 
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   <td>&nbsp;%ttl%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tos%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%id%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%dgmlen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%iplen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmptype%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpcode%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpid%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpseq%</td> 









dstip-detail.sql (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
SELECT 
 dst, 
 TO_DATE(timestamp) AS Date, 




























dstip-detail.tpl (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
<LPHEADER> 
  <table border=“0” width=“140%” cellspacing=“2”> 
  <tr> 
   <th><b>date</b></th> 
   <th><b>time</b></th> 
   <th><b>proto</b></th> 
   <th><b>src</b></th> 
   <th><b>srcport</b></th> 
   <th><b>sig_id</b></th> 
   <th><b>dstport</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethsrc</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethdst</b></th> 
   <th><b>ethlen</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpflags</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpseq</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpack</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcplen</b></th> 
   <th><b>tcpwindow</b></th> 
   <th><b>ttl</b></th> 
   <th><b>tos</b></th> 
   <th><b>id</b></th> 
   <th><b>dgmlen</b></th> 
   <th><b>iplen</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmptype</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpcode</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpid</b></th> 
   <th><b>icmpseq</b></th> 




  <tr> 
   <td>&nbsp;%date%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%time%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%proto%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%src%</td>  
   <td>&nbsp;%srcport%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%sig_id%</td>  
   <td>&nbsp;%dstport%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethsrc%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethdst%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ethlen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpflags%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpseq%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpack%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcplen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tcpwindow%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%ttl%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%tos%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%id%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%dgmlen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%iplen%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmptype%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpcode%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpid%</td> 
   <td>&nbsp;%icmpseq%</td> 









Graph_analysis.bat: (Adapted from Giuseppini, 2005 [5]) 
Logparser file:GraphTopAlerts.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:Pie3D -
groupSize:1600x800 -values:ON -chartTitle:”Top Alerts” -categories:OFF 
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Logparser file:GraphTopSrcIPs.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:Pie -
groupSize:1600x800 -values:OFF -chartTitle:”Top Source IP” -categories:OFF 
Logparser file:GraphAlertsPerHour.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:smoothline -
groupSize:1400x700 -values:OFF -chartTitle:”Alerts per Hour” -categories:OFF 
Logparser file:GraphTopDstPorts.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:mm/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:BarStacked -
groupSize:1200x600 -values:OFF -chartTitle:”Top Destination Ports” 
Logparser file:GraphTopSrcPorts.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:BarStacked -
groupSize:1200x600 -values:OFF -chartTitle:”Top Source Ports” 
Logparser file:GraphTopDstIPs.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:Pie -
groupSize:1600x800 -values:OFF -chartTitle:”Top Destination IP” -categories:OFF 
Logparser file:GraphTopProtocols.sql -i:csv -iHeaderFile:AlertHeader.csv -
iTsFormat:MM/dd/yy-hh:mm:ss -headerRow:off -o:chart -chartType:Pie -




 msg, ---sig_id, 
 Count(msg) as Alerts 
INTO report\AlertsTopAlerts.gif 
FROM alert.csv 
GROUP BY msg ---sig_id 





 Count(msg) as Alerts 
INTO report\AlertsTopSrcIPs.gif 
FROM alert.csv 
GROUP BY src 




 Count(*) as Alerts 









SELECT TOP 10 
 STRCAT(STRCAT(TO_STRING(srcport),' - '), proto) AS Source, 
 Count(*) as Alerts 
 USING src as SourcePort 
INTO report\AlertsTopSrcPorts.gif 
FROM alert.csv 
GROUP BY Source 





 Count(msg) as Alerts 
INTO report\AlertsTopDstIPs.gif 
FROM alert.csv 
GROUP BY dst 




 proto, ---sig_id, 
 Count(proto) as Alerts 
INTO report\AlertsTopProtocols.gif 
FROM alert.csv 
GROUP BY proto ---sig_id 




LogParser -i:TSV -o:CSV -iHeaderFile:honeydlog_header.tsv -headerRow:off -
iSeparator:space “SELECT* INTO honeyd1.csv FROM honeyd.log” 
 
honeydlog_header.tsv: 
timestamp proto T srcIP srcPort destIP destPort Info Comment 
 61 
APPENDIX C. NMAP OS DETECTION AGAINST HONEYD 
To specify the parameters used to emulate operating systems at TCP/IP 
stack level, Honeyd uses the same database “nmap.prints” file that is included in 
the Nmap software to properly detect specific operating systems. In this way, 
Honeyd tries to give the responses Nmap is expecting to receive from the probes 
and packets it sends. 
Honeyd’s configuration specifies how to respond to as many as nine 
TCP/IP packets and probes sent by the scanner: 
• TSeq (Test sequence) specifies how to derive the TCP packet 
sequence numbers. 
• T1 (Test 1), specifies how to respond to a SYN packet sent to an 
open TCP port. 
• T2, specifies how to respond to a NULL packet sent to an open 
TCP port. 
• T3, specifies how to respond to a SYN, FIN, PSH, and URG packet 
sent to an open TCP port. 
• T4, specifies how to respond to an ACK packet sent to an open 
TCP port. 
• T5, specifies how to respond to a SYN packet sent to a closed TCP 
port. 
• T6, specifies how to respond to an ACK packet sent to a closed 
TCP port. 
• T7, specifies how to respond to a FIN, PSH, and URG packet sent 
to a closed TCP port. 
• PU, specifies how to respond to a probe sent to a closed UDP port. 
For example, the following results are expected for these tests for a 
Windows XP OS updated with Service Pack 1. 
 
Fingerprint Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1 
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This first-generation operating-system detection method used by earlier 
versions of Nmap worked well with Honeyd.  But on December 2007, a second-
generation detection method was released for Nmap in version 4.50, which is 
more complete, effective, and accurate than the previous one. This method 
includes other packets, probes, and tests that make Honeyd’s emulation 
methods significantly less effective. The new file that contains the database is 
called “nmap-os-db” (Nmap operating system database) and includes several 
new tests and significant changes to the previous tests and responses. 
The new method sends up to 16 TCP, UDP, and ICMP probes to perform 
13 different tests, nine derived from the first-generation fingerprinting and four 
new. These tests are: 
• SEQ, TCP sequence generation (similar to the older TSeq) 
• OPS, TCP options 
• WIN, TCP initial window size 
• ECN, TCP explicit congestion notification 
• T1-T7 (similar to the older T1-T7) 
• U1, UDP packet send to a closed port (similar to the older PU) 
• IE, ICMP echo request 
Here is the same Windows XP SP1 in the database of the second-
generation method used by Nmap. 
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# Windows XP Professional with SP1 
Fingerprint Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP1 


















Consequently, using Nmap 4.5 to detect the operating system for a host 
emulated by Honeyd, results in either failure or multiple operating-system 
matches. For instance, if we emulate Microsoft XP SP1 with Honeyd, Nmap 5 will 
display the message “No exact OS matches for the host.” 
Is it possible to make the necessary changes to “nmap.prints” file to work 
well with the second generation Nmap? To answer this we need to analyze the 
meaning of the results and then try to adapt “nmap.prints” to what new versions 
of Nmap expect to receive. 
TSeq test, the TCP sequence test (now called SEQ), needs the 
modifications shown in Table 14. We also must change the format for the 
timestamp from an integer 7, to its equivalent in first-generation, 100HZ. 
Moreover, we need to respond to the following new tests: TCP ISN sequence 








Class - OS classification or device type 
gcd GCD TCP ISN greatest common divisor 
SI -  
IPID TI, CI, II IP ID sequence generation algorithm 
TS TS TCP timestamp option algorithm 
Table 14.   Modifications in Tseq test 
 
The seven tests from T1 to T7 have the modifications shown in Table 15. 
The following subtests are new in second generation and do not appear in the 
first-generation: IP initial time-to-live (T), IP initial time-to-live guess (TG), TCP 








Resp R Responsiveness 
DF DF Do not fragment bit 
W W Windows size. 
ACK A TCP acknowledged number 
Flags F TCP flags 
Ops O TCP options 
Table 15.   Modifications in tests T1–T7 
 
The PU test, a probe sent to a closed UDP port now called U1 needs the 
modifications shown in Table 16. We need to change the G (good) in second 
generation to an E (expected) in the results for RID, RIPCK, UCK and DAT tests.  
Also, the following subtests are new in the second generation and do not appear 
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in the first generation: IP initial time-to-live (T), IP initial time-to-live guess (TG) 
and unused port unreachable field non-zero (UN). Three complete tests are 
entirely new in the second-generation: TCP options (OPS), TCP initial window 







Resp R Responsiveness 
DF DF Do not fragment bit 
TOS - Type of Service, removed in new version 
IPLEN IPL IP total length 
RIPTL RIPL Returned probe IP total length value 
RID RID Returned probe IP ID value 
RIPCK RICPK Integrity of returned probe IP checksum value 
UCK RUCK Integrity of returned probe UDP checksum 
ULEN - UDP length 
DAT RUD Returned data 
Table 16.   Modifications in PU test 
 
Considering the equivalent values in both methods, we could make some 
changes to try to adapt a first generation fingerprint to a new version of Nmap. 
Unfortunately, experiments with operating-system detection were disappointing, 
and Nmap’s guesses for the operating system were diverse. 
To get more success in the operating-system detection, we can change 
the “default TCP action” to “open,” instead of the commonly used “reset” or 
“block.” With this modification the emulated operating system is detected by 
Nmap with confidence values between 80% and 90%, but the high number of 
open ports in the host is not a credible configuration and could be suspicious if 
an attacker inspected it. With this modification, we could also emulate new 
operating systems not available in the original “nmap.prints” file, like Windows XP 
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SP3, Windows Server 2008, or Windows 7—all of which could be detected by 
new versions of Nmap with similar confidence values. 
The following are the fingerprints created for these operating systems: 
 












Fingerprint Microsoft Windows Server 2008 
























Until there is a patch or a new Honeyd version that works better with 
second-generation Nmap, in order to simulate different operating systems we 
have to rely on a credible port configuration, opening common, or well-known 
ports for the operating system we want to emulate.   
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